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ISSUES AND FACTS RAISED BY RESPONDENT AND INTERVENORS FAIL TO 
OVERCOME THE OPENING BRIEF'S COMPELLING ARGUMENTS. 
The County ("Respondent) and Neighbors ' for Responsible Growth ("Intervenor") 
misrepresent the facts and misapprehend the law in a further arbitrary and capricious attempt to 
justify the Board of County Commissioners ("BOCC") bowing to political pressure and refusing 
to fulfill its legal obligations as a quasi-judicial body by effectively legislatively rezoning the 
land in question. 
First, at the second hearing the BOCC unreasonably and unethically ignored the post 
mediation agreement reached by the parties while the first appeal was pending to limit the issues 
on remand to the Board, which Respondents admit that KHD fully satisfied (Respondent's Brief 
at p. 26). Respondents only rely on the District Court's legal finding that estoppel didn't apply- 
a purely legal question for this court, and they could introduce wholly new issues at the second 
hearing. The law on these issues -fully established in Idaho and nationally - is clear. Kirk- 
Hughes Development, LLC, under these circumstances was entitled to have its application for a 
planned unit development ("PUD") approved based on the satisfaction of the post-mediation 
terms Indeed, neither Respondent nor Intervenor effectively contradict the established law 
based on quasi-estoppel and administrative res judicata. 
Second, the facts as to the County's arbitrary and capricious co~lduct are quite startling. 
Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC ("KHD") sought to build a private resort community of 475 
dwelling units, with extraordinary set asides for open space and preservation of all wetlands, on 
land zoned by Respondent for an allowable as of right density of 1,000 dwelling units. KHD 
submitted an application for a quasi-judicial administrative planned unit development ("PUD"), 

not a legislative rezoning. ICHD's plans met all planning and engineer infrastructure 
requirements for fire and roads, water and sewer, environmental preservation and open space, as 
found in the County Planning Staff Report (Record on Second Appeal, 2065-2301). The County 
Hearing Examiner held extensive public hearings, and found that KHD's plan "is compatible 
with the goals and policies of the Comprehensive Plan" and recommended approval, subject to 
certain standard conditions, which KHD agreed to undertake. (March 2, 2006 Hearing Examiner 
Report, Record on First Appeal, 1655-57) 
At the first BOCC hearing, citizen objections were raised that no new growth should be 
permitted at all on KHD's land (Transcript of July 13, 2006 Proceedings, Record on First 
Appeal, Vol. 2). Chairman Currie, without BOCC authority or notice to KHD, conducted an 
illegal ex parte amateur "traffic study" by twice driving I-lighway 97 (Transcript of July 27,2006 
Proceedings, Record on First Appeal, 0394-96), which "study" he thereafter convinced the entire 
BOCC to adopt in lieu of the Idaho Transportation Department's ("ITD) study, Plamling Staff, 
the Hearing Examiner and KHD's traffic experts that KHD's development had adequate capacity 
on Highway 97 and met all traffic safety requirements. KHD had actually agreed in the post- 
mediation agreement to construct a bridge over Highway 97, which further reduced the demand 
on the highway created by the KHD development. Indeed, ignoring the findings of the Hearing 
Examiner based on expert testimony and the written findings of the ITD, the BOCC denial 
arbitrarily and capriciously found: 
"The position of ITD was not supported by the public testimony or the personal 
experiences of the BOCC. As a body the BOCC has almost one-hundred and fifty 
years of experience living in Kootenai County. The members have, over the 
years, traveled Highway 97 for personal as well as professional reason [sic] both 
for the County and in private employment. It has been their personal experience 
that Highway 97 in its present state is not conducive to this increased level of 
development." (ROA, First Appeal, 1966). 

Third, the BOCC, as a matter of law, wrongfully concluded that the "single most relevant 
question is whether this project is appropriate for the location," completely ignoring the fact that 
their legislative rezoning question was answered in the affirmative when the property was 
previously zoned as consistent and compatible with the comprehensive plan and properly located 
for approximately 1,000 dwellings - more than double what KHD was seelcing to build. 
KHD brought the matter before the District Court. During the appeal, the parties entered 
into a Post-Mediation Agreement wherein the Board and ICHD identified the specific actions that 
ICHD could talce to obtain a permiUapprova1 of the PUD, and expedited the hearing process so 
that KHD could comply with the requirements and move forward. 
KHD fulfilled all of its obligations under the Post-Mediation Agreement and filed with 
the County, a slightly revised application with the few modifications required to meet the terms 
of the Post-Mediation Agreement, together with a subdivisioil plat application, in anticipation of 
the agreed upon expedited hearing process. The County Planning Staff, which was intimately 
involved in the process, recommended approval with the standard conditions (County Planning 
Staff Report, Record on Appeal, 2065-2301). 
The BOCC, instead of hearing the issues raised under the Post-Mediation Agreement, 
appears from the record of intervenor objections to all development on the KHD property, to 
have gone totally out of its way to find any excuse to deny KHD approval, concluding that while 
the KHD application did satisfy the Goals of the County's Comprehensive Plan that were at issue 
under the Agreement - but then added five new Goals of incompatibility, that the first Board and 
Hearing Examiner findings did not raise and to which they had no objections. 

11. RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS PROVIDE AMPLE SUPPORT JUSTIFYING 
RATHER THAN REPUDIATING THE FACT THAT THE BOARD'S FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS DENYING THE KHD QUASI-JUDICIAL APPLICATION 
WERE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
A. The Comprehensive Plan Argument. 
Appellant is frankly puzzled as to how Respondent can claim the BOCC's finding the application 
to be incompatible with the County' comprehensive plan was not arbitrary, capricious and an 
abuse of discretion. For the District Court to uphold the BOCC's decision under the clearly 
erroneous standard, it must still conclude that the record contains some reliable, probative and 
substantial evidence in support of the Board's position. See, I.C. $67-5279(3)(d): (3 )"....the 
Court shall affirm the agency action ... unless the 'Court finds that the agency's findings, 
inferences, conclusions or decisions are (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record 
as a whole" Dove1 v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 831 P.2d 527 (1992). Where such lack of 
substantial evidence occurs, erroneous decisions of the administrative agency will be corrected 
on appeal. Homestead Farms, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, 141 
Idaho 855,119 P.3d 630 (2005). 
On page 12 of its brief, Respondent identifies seven (7) goals listed in the coinprehensive 
plan - Goals 4, 7, 9, 14, 17, 23 and 24 - that the application allegedly did not meet. Vet 
mysteriously, the BOCC, on August 24, 2006, did not find that KHD was incompatible with 
Goals 4,9, 17, 23 & 24. (Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 26-27) and indeed the Hearing Officer 
found and concluded that the KHD application met all of the Comprehensive Plan Goals (March 
2,2006 Hearing Examiner Report, Record on First Appeal, 1655-56). 
The BOCC failed to give proper consideration to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact, 
conclusions and recommendations. Where the Administrative Agency's findings disagree with 

those of the hearingpanel, the court will scrutinize the agency's findings more critically. Paul v. 
Board of Professional Discipline of the Idaho State Board of Medicine, 134 Idaho 838, 11 P. 3d 
34 (2000). Under the Administrative Procedure Act, in reviewing agency action, the Court is 
required to engage in a thorough probing in depth review. Western Watershed Project v. 
Kraayenbrink, 538 F .  Supp. 2d 1308 (D. Idaho, 2008). 
Where the evidence on appeal is without substantial and reasonable conflict, it becomes a 
question of law for the Supreme Court as to whether the evidence will support the conclusioi~ 
reached by the Board. In Re PaciJic National Life Assurance Company, 70 Idaho 98, 212 P.2d 
379 (1949), and the Court uses "fiee review." Riverside Development Company v. Vandenberg, 
137 Idaho 382,48 P.3d 1271 (2002). In a recent land use approval case, even involving rezoning 
of the land, this Court held that where there is a mistaken interpretation of fact in denying the 
zoning on even one point, no less than the total absence of substantial evidence for all of its 
conclusions as in this case, the City erred. Lane Ranch Partnership v. City ofSun Valley, 144 
Idaho 584,590, 166 P.3d 374 (2007). 
Although the district court in this case did not take into account the Hearing Examiner's findings, 
conclusio~ls and recommendations, the appellate court will scrutinize the agency's factual 
findings more critically if they contradict the Hearing Examiner's conclusions, than if they 
accord with the Hearing Examiner's findings. Wood$eld v. Board ofProfessiona1 Discipline oj  
Idaho State Board ofMedicine, 127 Idaho 738; 905 P.2d 1047 (1995). 
The only two Goals, 7 & 14, raised at the first hearing were related to hazardous areas 
and traffic, which the post-mediation agreement specifically addressed and all conditions relating 
to those two Goals were completely satisfied. KHD abated all traffic congestion by building the 

bridge over Highway 97 and mitigated all wetlands and hillside areas. See the County Planning 
Staff Report of August 23, 2007 finding that all conditions had been satisfied and the KHD 
development application was completely compatible with all Comprehensive Goals (Record on 
Second Appeal, 2065-2301). As the post-mediation application was nothing inore than a slightly 
modified version of the original application to address the limited two Goal issues agreed upon 
in the Post-Mediation Agreement, the only rational conclusion is that the Respondent's findings 
and conclusions based on five new goals it found to be in compliance in the first hearing are 
arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. Where an agency changes its course by 
rescinding its prior action, it is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond 
that which is required in the first place. Western Watershed Project v. Majetko, 468 F. 3d 1099 
(9'h Cir., Idaho, 2006), 
Respondent merely stretches its already weak position by looking to Uvvutia v. Blaine 
County, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (2000) for justification of the BOCC's improper reliance on 
the comprehensive plan to deny KHD's application, but Urrutia does not support Respondent's 
position. This Court's position in Urrutia, and throughout Idaho case law, supports ICHD's 
position: 
"[A] comprehensive plan and a zoning ordinance are distinct concepts serving 
different purposes. A comprehensive plan reflects the "desirable goals and 
objectives, or desirable future situations" for the land within a jurisdiction. I.C. 
567-6508. This Court has held that a comprehensive plan does not operate as 
legally controlling zoning law, but rather serves to guide and advise the 
governmental agencies responsible for making zoning decisions. [citations 
omitted]. The Board may, therefore, refer to the coinprehensive plan as a general 
guide in instances involving zoning decisions such as revising or adopting a 
zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, by contrast, reflects the permitted uses 
allowed for various parcels within the jurisdiction. See I.C. 567-651 1 ." Urrutia, 
134 Idaho at 357-58; 2 P.3d at 742-43 (Emphasis added). 

In other words, where the BOCC is deciding to revise or adopt a zoning ordinance, the 
comprehensive plan should serve as its guide. We can assume that the BOCC loolced to 
the comprehensive plan as a guide when it zoned the land for approximately 1,000 
dwellings as a use by right. In the present instance, there was no request to revise or 
adopt a zoning ordinance, and there has never been any question but that KHD's 
application for 475 dwellings falls well within the density and size limitations of the 
zoning ordinance 
In Urrutia, this Court was faced with strikingly similar facts. There, the 
appellants were denied a permit to build a subdivision that comported with the zoning 
ordinance because the development supposedly did not strictly comply with all of the 
provisions of the comprehensive plan. There the court ruled that: 
"It is to be expected that the land to be subdivided may not agree with all 
provisions in the comprehensive plan, but a more specific analysis, 
resulting in denial of a subdivision application based solely on non- 
compliance with the comprehensive plan elevates the plan to the level of 
legally controlling zoning law. Such a result affords the Board unbounded 
discretion in examining a subdivision application and allows the Board to 
effectively re-zone land based on the general language in the 
comprehensive plan. As indicated above, the comprehensive plan is 
intended merely as a guideline whose primary use is in guiding zoning 
decisions. Those zoning decisions have already been made in this 
instance, and land subdivided into twenty-acre lots and used for single 
family residences is specifically permitted in this agricultural area. Thus, 
we agree with the district judge that the Board erred in relying completely 
on the comprehensive pl an..." Urrutia at 358-359. (Emphasis added.) 
As in Urrutia, KHD was entitled to rely on the legally controlling zoning law, which 
permitted approximately twice as many dwellings as KHD was seeking to build. When 
the BOCC found KHD's applications to be incompatible with the surrounding 
neighborhood, it effectively re-zoned the property, purportedly using the general policies 

set forth in the comprehensive plan (with which in fact the KHD development application 
complied and was compatible) as the overt basis for denying KHD's application. 
It is entirely inappropriate for the BOCC to revisit the question of whether 
development that comports with the applicable zoning should be allowed, yet that is 
exactly what Respondent did here, despite clear Idaho law to the contrary. 
B. Water Service. 
On page 16 of its brief, Respondent concedes that KHD planned to build water storage 
units to be used if the project could not draw down its allotted water from Lake Coeur d'Alene 
and from five (5) wells on the property, yet argues that the BOCC was "not satisfied that ICHD 
had made adequate plans for water service" in low water years. 
Pointedly, the Hearing Officer found that "the services and facilities (available water 
service) necessary to serve the development are feasible, available and any adverse impact will 
be adequately mitigated". (March 2, 2006 Hearing Examiner Report, Record on First Appeal, 
1655-1656). Similarly, the County Planning Staff found that the plans for water service were 
fully adequate. (County Planning Staff Report, Record on Second Appeal, 2065-2301). 
Ironically, neither the BOCC during the initial application process, nor during the mediation, nor 
the terms of the Post-Mediation Agreement, where the BOCC had ample opportunity to raise 
such a concern, address this issue. 
Only after the fact, after I(HD has fulfilled its obligations under the Agreement, does this 
issue arise. Respondent provides no basis for this conclusion - no specific findings, no expert 
testimony to contradict the Hearing Examiner, the Planning Staff or the Idaho Department of 
Water Resources ("IDWR) which issued water permits -just undocumented lay opinions and 

statements made by members of the public. Indeed, Respondents concede that KHD had 
obtained permits from the IDWR that fully met the water requirements of the project on a 
permanent basis (Administrative Record, p. 2208-10, 3729-35) (Respondent's Brief, p. 16). 
Moreover, KHD satisfied the IDWR requirements during any droppage of the Spolcane River by 
requiring that KHD build storage facilities to meet any shortfall (Administrative Record, 2208- 
10,3729-35). 
C. Wastewater Treatment 
Similarly with regard to wastewater treatment, Respondent concedes that ISHD's 
wastewater treatment facility was acceptable to the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality 
(IDEQ) (Respondent's Brief at p.17), which found it to be adequate and safe, yet argues that its 
rejection of the project was appropriate because the BOCC concluded, without a shred of 
evidence to support it, that a hypothetical failure of the system could lead to effluent flowing to 
neighboring properties. Yet this very same system was used, with County approval, at another 
development of far greater density, on a permanent basis at the nearby Gozzer Ranch and Lake 
Club. 
Pointedly, the Hearing Officer found that "the services and facilities (including waste 
water treatment) necessary to serve the development are feasible, available and any adverse 
impact will be adequately mitigated". (March 2, 2006 Hearing Examiner Report, Record on 
First Appeal, 1655-1656). Similarly, the County Planning Staff found that the plans for 
wastewater treatment were fully adequate. (County Planning Staff Report, Record on Second 
Appeal, 2065-230). 

Again, this was not an issue for the Hearing Officer or the BOCC during the initial 
application process or the mediation, and the Post-Mediation Agreement, where the BOCC had 
ample opportunity to raise such a concern, does not address it. Only after the fact, after ICHD 
has fulfilled its obligations under the Agreement, does this issue arise. Respondent provides no 
basis for this conclusion - no specific findings, no expert testi~nony - just the apparent lay 
opinion of the BOCC and statements made by members of the public. 
D. Wetlands 
Respondent's arguments pertaining to wetlands are simply more of the same - inaccurate. 
KHD proposed turning the 23 acres of wetlands presently on the property into 30 acres of 
wetlands. The Agreement called for, and KHD agreed, that "[alny disturbance of wetlands shall 
be in compliance with federal, state and local regulations and permitting, including those of the 
United States Army Corp of Engineers." 
Tom Duebendorfer, a professional wetlands scientist, prepared a revised Wetlands Impact 
Analysis and Proposed Conceptual Wetlands Mitigation report, setting forth how KHD would 
mitigate hydrologic protection areas (HPAs) beginning with the mitigation for HPA 
encroachments, including HPAs on creeks, HPAs on wetlands and HPAs in areas adjacent to 
proposed wetland fills. 
Respondent alleges in its brief at pages 18-19, for the first time, that the ICHD failed to 
comply with subsection 9-15-7(C)(2) of the zoning ordinance. Specifically, Respondent 
emphasizes that proposed roads and utilities are to be kept to a miniinum, and that the Board may 
require an easement. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 18-19). This alleged issue was never raised by the 
Hearing Examiner, by Planning Staff or by the BOCC at any time. Moreover, not only is this the 

first time this issue has been raised, but Respondent provides not a scintilla of evidence to 
support its contention. This is just another example of the County coming up, after the fact, with 
"findings" to support its pre-conceived decision to ltill this project, and of the arbitrary and 
capricious nature of the County's actions in this instance. Respondent's argument that KHD 
failed to adequately mitigate potential damage to wetlands is sheer hyperbole. 
Instead, the BOCC relied on "public testimony that man-made wetlands do not perform 
as well as natural wetlands" (Respondent's Brief, page 19). Again, no evidence but statements 
of lay opinion were provided and the scientific evidence was ignored. See W W.P. v. US. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, 535 F .  Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Idaho, 2007) (a presumption of agency expertise 
may be rebutted if there is no reasoned scientific expertise behind its decision). 
E. Runoff and Erosion 
Respondent again relies on the comprehensive plan, which identifies certain soil types as 
susceptible to slippage, to argue that the property is inappropriate for development, but ignores 
the fact that the County previously zoned the property for approximately 1,000 dwelli~lg units, 
which would create twice the slippage on a conventional subdivision as of right. Indeed, the 
Planning Staff Report of August 23,2007 found: 
" Based on zoning designations, the maximum potential number of residential 
lots for this site is approximately 1050 lots.. .It should be noted that.. .the proposal 
has reduced the maximum potential density to less than half of the potentially 
allowable dwelling units." (County Planning Staff Report, Record on second 
Appeal, 2065-2301) 
The Respondent can't have it both ways. It cannot zone a property for this level of 
development, and then deny the application based on notion that the land is unsuited to building 
a development with half as many units! The Hearing Officer found that there was no prospect of 

runoff and erosion from the property because the plans had sophisticated stormwater 
management design and management. (March 2, 2006 Hearing Examiner Report, Record on 
First Appeal, 1655-1656). Similarly, the County Planning Staff found that the plans for 
stormwater management were fully adequate. (County Planning Staff Report, Record on Second 
Appeal, 2065-2301). 
Respondent's answer is to cling to the materials submitted by William Boyd, a local 
attorney. What is left unstated is that Mr. Boyd's materials are 12 years old, and were prepared 
in opposition to a zoning change concerning an application to do mining on acreage not included 
in KHD's 578 acres! This may be the most irrelevant document the BOCC relied on and is 
perhaps the most prominent evidence of why the BOCC's actions must be deemed arbitrary and 
capricious and an abuse of discretion. 
P. Transportation 
In arguing the transportation issues raised by KHD, the Respondent focuses on the phrases and 
parts it wants, and simply misstates the facts in order to support its decision. Contrary to 
Respondent's statement at page 21 of its brief, the East Side Highway District (ESHD) did not 
oppose the project, it merely outlined several suggestions and criteria that need to be met - many 
of which KUD has already met or initiated. With regard to the description of the terrain as 
"mountainous" versus "rolling," which Respondent gives so much weight, ESI-ID in its own 
letter to the Kootenai County Planning Department, states the "terrain is rolling to mountainous." 
(August 14,2007 EDHD letter, ROA pp. 2509-2512). 
As noted in Respondent's Brief, the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) concurred 
with the methodology and findings of the Transpo study and with the proposed overpass over 

Highway 97, to be build by ICHD, and concluded that Highway 97 would not reach 80% of 
capacity until 2022. Despite this, the Respondent suggests that the existence of construction 
traffic could be "significant," implying that no one should ever build anything because there 
might temporarily be trucks on the highway as a result. 
Perhaps the most disturbing example of the arbitrary and capricious nature of the process 
in this instance is the BOCC's reliance on amateur traffic studies of Highway 97. Although the 
BOCC aclcnowledged that the issues surrounding Highway 97 fall under the jurisdiction of the 
ITD, it nevertheless completely disregards ITD's professional assessment of the highway's 
capacity, relying instead, upon Chairman Currie's novice survey. Even though Mr. Currie took 
his drive of Highway 97 in 2006, he brought it before the Board in December 2007, stating: 
"Uh, I have major concerns with Highway 97. Uh uh and what happens to 97 in 
the future. Right now there is uh (inaudible) that approximately if everybody 
from the east side of the Lake comes in today and wants a building permit we 
would have to issue in the neighborhood of four thousand building permits. And 
that road just can't handle it. So, what do we tell those people down the line uh 
when the road does not handle it that could have gotten a building permit today" 
(Exhibit 13, pg. 8, ins. 3-10; A.R. 3928:3-10) 
Commissioner Piazza made a similar statement: 
"The highway is another issue that there are 1500 homes out there right now the 
possibility of another 4500 just with the existing parcels." (Tr., Vol. 3, p. 415, 11 
9-15). 
What is the legal basis for a Coininissioner making a decision concerning an application 
currently before the Board based on the hypothetical of what other members of the public might 
or might not choose to do months or years "down the line?!" This is a gross violation of I.C. 
567-6535, which sets forth in pertinent part: 
"(c) It is the intent of the legislature that decisions made pursuant to this chapter 
should be founded upon sound reason and practical application of recognized 
principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, the courts of the state are directed 

to consider the proceedings as a whole and to evaluate the adequacy of procedures 
and resultant decisions in light of practical considerations with an emphasis on 
fundamental fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-making." 
Moreover, it is a clear violation of KHD's due process rights. A quasi-judicial officer must 
confine his decision to the record produced at the public hearing. Idaho Iiistoric Preservation 
Council v. City of Boise, 134 Idaho 651; 8 P.3d 646 (2000). In Comer v. Counly of Twin Falls, 
130 Idaho 433; 942 P.2d 557 (1997), the Twin Falls Board of Commissioners violated the 
Appellant's due process rights when they viewed the property without giving notice and without 
giving the parties the opportunity to be present. In the instant case, Mr. Currie, Chairman of the 
BOCC, chose to do an amateur traffic study on his own and without notice KI-ID. He then used 
his results to testify against the project, to convince his fellow Board Members to vote against 
the project and to himself vote against the project. This Court in Comer, found: 
"The opportunity to be present at a view provides opposing parties the 
opportunity to rebut the facts derived from the'visit that may come to bear on the 
ultimate decision and create an appearance of bias. A view of the subject 
property without notice to the interested parties by a Board . . . has been held a 
violation of due process." Comer, 134 Idaho at 438; 8 P.3d at 562. 
There is no evidence that four thousand permit applications waiting to be brought before the 
Board. There is no basis in law or fairness for a County to discriminate against KHD by 
requiring it to step aside in order to permit some mythical applicants to come forward. 
G. Emergency Services 
Respondent sets forth on page 22 of its brief that Emergency Medical Services (EMS) is 
provided by the Coeur d'Alene Fire Department. Respondent again misstates the facts. As was 
stated in letters to the Icootenai Planning Department, the East Side Fire Protection District 
("ESFD") is increasing its services to include first responder capabilities, so the issue of a 20- 

minute drive is both irrelevant and moot (March 29, 2007 ESFD Memo, ROA p. 2505). As 
conceded by Respondent (Respondent's Brief at p. 22): 
"In an effort to mitigate these concerns, ESFD required KHD to convey land for a 
fire station, pay for the construction of the station, and build a helipad suitable for 
air ambulance service, conditions which were agreeable to KHD. (Agency 
Record, 2450,251 I)." 
All of these conditions were agreed to, despite the great cost involved, by KHD. 
H. Respondent Disregards All Expert Testimony in Favor of Public Comment and 
Cannot Point to a Single Public Agency Supportive of its Conclusory Findings. 
The Court is obligated to overrule the "factual" findings ofthe BOCC when, as here, they 
are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. Uhl v. Ballard Medical Products, Inc., 
138 Idaho 653, 657; 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003); Curtis v. M.H. King Co., 142 Idaho 383; 128 
P.3d 920,922 (2005). 
The facts throughout this process have shown the BOCC to have had a troubling habit of 
completely disregarding the experts - those working for the State of Idaho and for Kootenai 
County, as well as those retained by KHD - and instead deferring to, and relying exclusively on, 
the opinioiis of its members and on statements by the public. Again and again, Respondent 
points out that the BOCC is relying on "public testimony." While conceding that KHD was 
relying on the support of all the state agencies, the Hearing Examiner and the County Planning 
Staff, the Respondent also concedes that despite the County's own lack of expert testimony or 
documentation, KHD produced substantial and even voluminous expert and scientific evidence, 
concedi~lg: 
"ICHD certainly provided voluminous evidence in support of the Chateau 
application, including plans, studies and other documents prepared by engineers 
and other design professionals." (Respondent's Brief, p. 15) 

Respondent further alleges at page 15-16 that public testimony and comments received by public 
agencies raised concerns. Yet in neither of their briefs can Respondent or Intervenor cite to a 
single state, county or local public agency that supports the County's position on any point. 
At the same time Respondent concedes that all state agencies, ITD, IDWR and IDEQ have 
approved of KIiD's plans. 
The only local agencies Respondent identifies as purportedly opposing the prqject are 
the East Side Highway District ("ESHD) and the East Side Fire Protection District ("ESFD), 
but even there, Respondent's contention is unsupportable. A review of the ESHD letter of 
August 14, 2007 (A.R. 2509-2512) clearly evidences no such opposition, merely an outline of 
several suggestions and criteria to be met - all of which KHD has already met or initiated in both 
of its applications. 
A review of the ESFD meinorandurn of March 29, 2007 (A.R. 2505-2506) sets forth that 
that KHD has "already paid taxes for sufficient stations and vehicles to provide for necessary 
emergency vehicles" (emphasis added) and upon KHD (1) meeting all relevant international fire 
codes and (2) deeding one acre of land to ESFD, ESFD "will have no life-safety related 
objections to approval of the PUD." (A.R., 2505-2506) (Emphasis added). 
Similarly, the ESFD memorandum of August 16, 2007 (A.R. 2504) sets forth that ICHD 
will (1) comply with all relevant international fire codes; (2) deed one acre of land to ESFD for a 
fire station; and (3) pay to build a fire station. It goes on to say: "When the above requirements 
are satisfied, ESFD will have no life-safety related objections to approval of the PUD." (A.R., 
2504) (Emphasis added). 
Quasi-judicial determinations must be based upon competent evidence and acceptable 
scientific documentation, not unsupported statements of possible future events, or on some 

layperson's opinion. The Court is obligated to overrule the "factual" findings of the BOCC 
when, as here, they are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. Uhl v. Ballard 
Medical Products, Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657; 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003); Curtis v. M H  King 
Co., 142 Idaho 383; 128 P.3d 920, 922 (2005). Anything less is inherently arbitrary and 
capricious. 
111. THE RESPONDENT BOCC IS BARRED BY THE QUASI-ESTOPPEL BRANCH 
OF THE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE FROM VIOLATING ITS POST- 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT WITH APPELLANT, KHD. 
Intervenors' brief fails to discuss the estoppel issues raised by KI-ID before the BOCC, the 
district court and in the KHD opening brief on appeal, thus conceding those issues to Appellant. 
The Respondent County brief mistakenly asserts at page 31, that as a matter of law ICHD could 
not meet any of the elements of equitable estoppel, which respondent asserts, in contradiction to 
the clear law of quasi-estoppel, requires: (1) a false representation of a material fact; (2) that the 
party asserting the estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) the false 
representation was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) the person to whom the 
false representation was made, relied and acted upon the representation to its prejudice, citing 
Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19,22,644 P. 2d 341,344 (1982), 
ignoring the Christiansen v. City ofPocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 124 P. 3d 1008 (2005) holding that 
quasi-estoppel and equitable estoppel are part and parcel of the same doctrine; and that there is 
no need to show detrimental reliance, Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P. 3d 310 (2006); nor 
any misrepresentation of fact or detrimental reliance ia establishing quasi-estoppel. C & G, Inc. 
v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 144, 145, 75 P. 3d 194,198 (2003) ("quasi- 
estoppel applies when (1) the offending party took a different position than its original position, 
and (2) either the offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other 

In Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807; 186 P. 2d 663 (2008), this Court laid out the doctrine in 
full: "This doctrine applies when: (I) the offending party took a different position than his or her 
original position, and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a 
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change positions; or (c) it 
would he unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from 
one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. C & G, Inc., 139 Idaho at 145, 75 
P.3d at 199." Allen, 145 Idaho at 812, 186 P.3d at 668. 
In the 27 years since Twin Falls was decided, this Court has decided nine (9) cases that 
establishes that the quasi-estoppel branch of the equitable estoppel doctrine, as set out in the 
ICHD opening brief, is not founded upon a false representation, does not require reliance or 
prejudice and is not based on failure to discover the tmth.' As held in Atwood v. Smith, 143 
Idaho 110; 138 P. 3d 310 (2006): 
"The doctrine of quasi-estoppel prevents a party from asserting a right, to the 
detriment of another party, which is inconsiste~it with a position previously 
taken." Atwood, 143 Idaho at 114, 138 P.3d at 314. 
In amplifying the inconsistent position test, Bivdwood Subdivision HOA v. Bulotti 
Construction, Inc, 145 Idaho 17; 175 P. 3d 179 (2007) held that there is no need to show 
any false misrepresentation, nor detrimental reliance, but there may he alternative 
evidence to show that it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to assert 
contradictory positions, citing Atwood at 11 5. The present situation perfectly meets all of 
the alternative inconsistent position, detrimental reliance and unconscionahility tests. At 
' Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807,186 P. 3d 663 (2008); Wynn v. Campbell, 145 Idaho 727, 184 P. 3d 852 (2008); 
Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P. 3d 731 (2005); In Re Estate ofElliott, 141 Idaho 177, 108 P.3d 324 
(2005); Christiansen v. City of Pocatello, 142 ldaho 132, 124 P. 3d 1008 (2005); Birdwood Subdivision HOA, Inc. 
v. Bulotti Construction, Inc., 145 Idaho 17, 175 P. 3d 179 (2007); Sorensen v. Saint Alphol~sus Regional Medical 
Center, Inc., 141 ldaho 754, 118 P. 3d 86 (2005); C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 Idaho 140,75 
P. 3d 194 (2003); and Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho, 110, 138 P. 3d 310 (2006). 

great cost, KHD prepared a revised application, abated its first appeal, made 
commitmellts to build a fire house, a bridge over Highway 97, and other mitigation, and 
entered into the Post-Mediation Agreement which stipulated the specific issues that 
would be considered at the second hearing, only to find that the BOCC had completely 
repudiated its publicly adopted agreement and sandbagged ICHD with whole new 
compreheilsive plan goal issues at the second hearing which the BOCC had found KHD 
to be in compliance with at the first hearing. Moreover, in raising these new 
comprehensive plan goals, the BOCC contradicted its position at the first hearing, the 
findings and conclusions and recommendation of the ,Hearing Examiner (which requires 
stricter scrutiny by the courts) and perhaps most importantly, repudiated the public policy 
of the judiciary to consider seriously the provisions of mediation agreements reached in 
settlement of litigation. Of all of the nine cases decided by this Court on quasi-estoppel, 
this case is the most compelling. 
The position taken by Respondent at page 30 of Respondent's brief that 
enforcement of estoppel in this situation would compromise the police power of the 
County rings false. There is no binding contract on the part of the County to adopt the 
planned development approval, to evade a second hearing on the application or to spot 
zone the property. The Post Mediation Agreement provided only that certain issues 
would be entertained at the hearing since the first hearing and the subsequent mitigation 
actions of KHD had disposed of the remaining issues. This case does not involve an 
impairment of the County's police power at all. 
In deciding quasi-judicial functions the County is not exercising regulatory police 
power. Rosebud Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 128 Idaho 609, 
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917 P. 2d 766 (1996) (regulatory bodies performing legislative functions are not 
rigorously bound by administrative doctrines of stare decisis, but are so bound when 
exercising judicial functions); Washington Water Power Company v. Idaho Public 
Utilities Commission, 101 Idaho 567, 617 P. 2d 1242 (1980) (regulatory action is 
distinguishable from applying established law or to past facts in quasi-judicial 
function). 
In an identical situation the California Court of Appeals upheld a mediation 
settlement agreement which fixed the issues to be considered at a subsequent county 
public hearing on a discretionary approval against the arguments of neighboring 
interveners that the County had bargained away its police power or proscribed the 
statutory hearing process. Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. County of Sun Luis 
Obispo, 84 ~ a l . ~ p p . 4 "  221, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 740 (2000). For a full analysis of court 
decisions rejecting the bargaining away of the police power argument, see David L. 
Callies, Robert H. Freilich and Thomas E. Roberts, Cases and Materials on Land Use, 
Development Agreements, 168-182 (5'" ed. West, 2008). 
The Idaho Supreme Court decisions also reject the assertion made by Respondent at 
page 29 of its brief, citing a 1973 case, Harrell v. City oflewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506 P. 
2d 741 (1973), asserting that estoppel does not apply to governmental entities. In C & G, 
Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 P. 3d 194 (2003) and 
Christiansen v. City of Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 124 P. 3d 1008 (2005). 

Estoppel theories present mixed questions of law and fact. The Highlands, Inc. v. Hosac, 
130 Idaho 67, 69; 936 P.2d 1309, 1311 (1997) (citations omitted). Because mixed questions of 
law and fact are primarily questions of law, this Court exercises free review. Id 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has two branches: "estoppel in pais and equitable estoppel, 
which is based on the equitable principle that a person with full knowledge of the facts shall not 
be permitted to act in a manner inconsistent with his or her former position or conduct to the 
injury of anotl~er." Schiewe v. Farwell, 125 Idaho 70, 74; 867 P.2d 920, 948 (1992). Yet 
Respondent in its brief relies solely on the law surrounding equitable estoppel as its defense, 
even though KHD's opening brief shows that its position on equitable estoppel is wrong under 
Idaho law. Respondent, however, has totally missed the controlling law of quasi-estoppel. See 
Campbell v. Kildau, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731 (2005) (distinguishing quasi-estoppel from 
equitable estoppel). 
Respondent is reduced to mere sophistry in arguing against estoppel. It concedes from 
one side of its mouth that the Post-Mediation Agreement was a contract and that the County was 
bound by Idaho law to fulfill its contractual obligations; from the other side it argues that there 
was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel: 
"prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party, which is 
inconsistent with a position previously taken." C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway 
Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198 (2003). This doctrine applies 
when: (1) the offending party toolc a different position than his or her original 
position and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a 
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change 
positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to 
maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit 
or acquiesced in. Id. at 145, 75 P. 3d at 199; Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 
137 Idaho 352, 357, 48 P.3d 1241, 1246 (2002)." To prove quasi-estoppel, it is 
not necessary to show detrimental reliance; instead, there inust be evidence that it 
would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to assert allegedly 
contrary positions. Thomas, 137 at 357, 48 P.3d at 1246." Atwood v. Smith 143 
Idaho 110,114; 138 P.3d 310,314 (2006). 

Respondent's argument that the post-mediation application constituted an entirely new 
application process and that despite the very clear language of the Post-Mediation Agreement, 
Respondent was under no obligation to fulfill its contractual obligation is sheer nonsense. 
Notwithstanding Respondent's attempts at obfuscation, the Mediation Agreement could not be 
clearer. The Agreement sets forth at Paragraph 2 that "[tlhe Board and KHD agreed to and 
hereby identify the actions that applicant KHD can tale to obtain a permitiapproval of the PUD." 
Not some of the actions applicant can take, but the actions that will obtain approval of the PUD. 
It then identifies, in subsections A, B and C, those certain actions - building sites to comply with 
all laws, including those for building on slopes; any disturbance of wetlands to comply with all 
laws; and KHD to mitigate the effect of the development on Highway 97 - required of ICHD. In 
Paragraph 3, the Agreement expedites the hearing schedule so that KI-ID can comply with the 
requiremeilts and move forward. 
The Post-Mediation Agreement gave both parties something they wanted. Respondent 
got agreements from KHD to address the County's concerns regarding building on slopes, 
wetlands and traffic conditions on Highway 97 - the very issues it based its initial denial upon. 
KHD got an expedited process that would allow it to move forward with its project. "The 
doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to 
maintain a position inconsistent with the one in which he or she acquiesced, or of which he or 
she accepted a benefit." In re Estate o f  Elliott, 141 Idaho 177, 183, 108 P.3d 324, 330 (2005). 
The County received the benefit of its Post-Mediation Agreement. The District Court case was 
suspended and the County was saved considerable time and expense in not having to litigate. On 
the other hand, KHD spent considerable time and money in altering its plans to fulfill the 
County's stated objections. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel clearly applies in this instance. 

Moreover, the Agreement specifically references Idaho Code $67-6519(4)(c), which 
couldn't be clearer: 
"Whenever a governing board or zoning or planning and zoning cominission 
grants or denies a permit, it shall specify: . . . 
(c) The actions, if any, that the applicant could talce to obtain a permit." 
The purpose of I.C. $67-6519(4)(c) is to provide transparency in the planning process and to 
permit developers the opportunity to malce revisions that will permit them to move forward. 
KHD does not have to start from scratch and the BOCC does not get a new bite of the apple. If 
KHD did not meet the terms of the Mediation Agreement, the BOCC could deny the permit. The 
corollary was that upon meeting the terms of the Agreement, KHD would accomplish the 
requirements of the conceptual stage and would be allowed to go to the next stage. Contrary to 
the Respondent's argument, the hearings would not be a sham because the opportunity for public 
hearings to raise objections had already occurred. The public had raised its objections, and the 
BOCC had denied the application - that is why the case went to the District Court, and why there 
had been a mediation and a mediation agreement - the second round of expedited hearings were 
to follow up on KHD's fulfillment of its contractual obligation under the agreement. 
ICHD had an absolute right, as a matter of law, to bring a new application; it didn't need 
an agreement for that. Following Respondent's argument to its logical conclusion, there would 
be no point whatsoever to this, or any, mediation agreement with the County if all it means is 
that the County gets not just a new bite of the apple, but a whole new apple! 
Not only did Respondent violate the Mediation Agreement, its legal argument appears to 
be that LC. $67-6519(4)(c) is meaningless, that Respondent may identify some actions an 
applicant can take, but reserves the right to come up with other actions not previously identified. 
In other words, the Respondent argues the entire application process can be turned into a shell 

game where the Respondent gets to simply keep moving the target! Could anything be more 
arbitrary and capricious? This claimed ability of the County to play shell games is exactly why 
Respondent is estopped from bringing up new reasons for denying KHD's application. 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE FINALITY, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES 
JUDICATA PREVENT RESPONDENT FROM TAKING A NEW BITE OF THE 
APPLE IN THE SECOND HEARING. 
The doctrine of issue and claim preclusion, or res judicata, applies to administrative 
decisions. Madsen v. Idaho Depavtnzent of Tvansportation, 115 Idaho 1132, 722 P. 2d 1226 
(1989); Blackbuvn v. Olson, 69 Idaho 428,433, 207 P.2d 1160, 1163-64 (1949); Pence v. Idaho 
State Hovse Racing Comm'n, 109 Idaho 112, 115,705 P.2d 1067, 1070 (Id. App. 1985). 
The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue 
preclusion (collateral estoppel). Hindmavsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92,94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). 
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upoii the same claim or upon 
claims "relating to the sane cause of action . . . which might have been made." Id. Issue 
preclusion protects litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy. 
Rodviguez v. Dep't ofCovv., 136 Idaho 90,92,29 P.3d 401,403 (2001). 
Separate tests are used to determine whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies. 
See D.A.R., Inc. v. Sheffev, 134 Idaho 141, 144,997 P.2d 602,605 (2000). Indeed in Ticor Title 
Company v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119,123; 157 P. 3d 613, 617 (2007), the court held that res 
judicata: (1) serves to prevent corrosive disrespect which would follow if the same matter were 
twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) serves the public interest in protecting the courts 
against the burden of repetitive claims; and advances (3) the private interest in repose from 
the harassment of repetitive claims, citing Hindmavsh at 98. That is exactly the situation we 

have in this case with the repetitive harassment of KHD and the inconsistent positions taken by 
the BOCC. 
A. Issue Preclusion. 
Issue preclusion protects litigants froin having to relitigate an identical issue in a 
subsequent action. Rodriguez, 136 Idaho at 92; 29 P.3d at 403. Five factors are required in order 
for issue preclusion to bar the relitigation of an issue determined in a prior proceeding: 
"(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior 
litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be 
precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the 
merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or 
in privity with a party to the litigation." Rodriguez, 136 Idaho at 93, 29 P.3d at 404. 
In the present instance, the administrative process was complete. The County Planning 
Staff had been intimately involved in the matter throughout and the hearings before the Hearing 
Examiner and then before the BOCC gave the public ample opportunity to raise any and all 
issues. At the conclusion of the first set of hearings, the BOCC concluded that KHD's 
application failed to fulfill only two comprehensive plan goals - goals 7 (prevent or limit 
development activity in hazardous areas) and 14 (provide for the efficient, safe and cost-effective 
movement of people and goods) - which were specifically addressed and mitigated in the Post- 
Mediation Agreement. 
The doctrine of res judicata applies to all questions which might have been raised as well 
to all questions which were raised in the original agreement. In Andrus v. Nicholson, 145 Idaho 
774, 777, 186 P. 3d 630 (2008) this Court held: 

" As we said in Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 208 P. 241, 
242-43 (1922), "[Tlhe former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every 
matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but also as to every matter which 
might and should have been litigated in the first suit." The prior adjudication "extinguishes 
ail claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of 
action arose." Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 150; 804 P.2d 3 19, 323 (1990) 
(Emphasis added). 
At the time of the second hearing, the BOCC unilaterally reopened seven (7) 
comprehensive goal issues, concluding, despite its earlier findings, the findings of the Hearing 
Examiner, the Planning Department and the Post-Mediation Agreement, that the application 
fulfilled goals 4, 7, 9, 14, 17, 23 and 24. The County was precluded from making new findings 
with regard to (1) the goals it had concluded at the first hearings, had been satisfied; and (2) the 
goals it had previously had the opportunity to address. 
B. Claim Preclusion. 
For claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements: (1) same 
parties; (2) same claim or transaction; and (3) final judgment. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho 92 at 94; 
57 P.3d at 805; Farmers Nut? Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68, 878 P.2d 762, 767 (1994). In 
Andrus, 145 Idaho at 777, this Court held that 
"The determination of whether a group of facts constitutes a "transaction" is to be 
made "pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts 
are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient 
trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' 
expectations or business understandiilg or usage." Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments $24 (1982). A cause of action can be barred by a prior 
adjudication even though the theory of liability and supporting evidence 
differ from the cause of action actually litigated in the prior lawsuit. Magic 

Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434,437-39,849 P.2d 107, 110-1 12 
(19931." 
"The doctrine of claim preclusion extends to the decisions of administrative agencies." 
Pence v. Idaho State Horse Racing Cornrn'n, 109 Idaho 112, 707 P.2d 1067 (Idaho App. 1985). 
There can be no dispute but that the same parties and the same matter were brought before the 
County in a quasi-judicial hearing and that the sane facts and circumstances applied to the 
second hearing. The County was therefore barred from re-litigating the issues that had been 
decided at the time of the first hearing and of raising new issues that it had the opportunity to 
raise, but failed to do so. 
V. AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S PEES TO KHD IS CLEARLY APPROPRIATE 
IN THIS INSTANCE, WHERE RESPONDENT ACTED WITIlOUT A 
REASONABLE BASIS IN FACT OR IN LAW. 
It has long been the law in Idaho that attorney's fees may properly be awarded against a 
city or county. Averitt v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 100 Idaho 751; 605 P.2d 515, 516 (1980). 
"Idaho Code $12-117(1) states that: In any administrative or civil judicial 
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other 
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the 
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. I.C. $12-117(1) (2004). This Court has held that the purpose of this 
statute is "two-fold: '(1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency 
action; and (2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and 
unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting 
to correct mistakes agencies never should have made." Rincovev v. State, Dep't of 
Fin., Secs. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 549; 976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999) (quoting 
Bogner v. State Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854,859; 693 P.2d 1056, 
1061 (1984)). If the Court determines that a party acted without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law, an award of attorney fees under LC. § 12-1 17 is mandatory." 
Rincovev v. State, Dep't of Fin., Secs. Bureau, ,132 Idaho 547, 549; 976 P.2d 473, 
475 (1999). (Emphasis added.) 

Respondent, at page 41 of its brief, has the temerity to suggest attorney's fees should not 
be awarded because the Court is aslced to interpret a statute for the first time within the context of 
the facts of this case. Respondent does not mention how the facts here are "novel, nor what 
statute it believes the Court will be interpreting for the first time. 
The reality of the situation is that the County has, throughout this process, acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact and law and in utter disregard for its quasi-judicial responsibilities. The 
law here is clear. It is undisputed that the BOCC is required to act in a quasi-judicial capacity 
when it considers whether to approve or deny applications for subdivisions and PUDs. "A 
decision by a zoning board applying general rules or specific policies to specific individuals, 
interests or situations, are quasi-judicial in nature and subject to due process constraints." 
Chambers v. Kootenai County Bd of Comm'rs, 125 Idaho 11 5, 118 (1994) (applying zoning 
rules to specific applications is quasi-judicial); Cowan v. Bd, of Comrn 'rs of Fremont County, 
143 Idaho 501 (2006); Cooper v. Board of County Comm'vs ofAda County, 101 Idaho 407,411 
(1980). Neither the BOCC, nor any individual Commissioner, is allowed to advocate approval 
or denial of the application. "When acting upon a quasi-judicial zoning matter the governing 
board is neither a proponent nor an opponent of the proposal at issue, but sits instead in the seat 
of a judge." Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P. 3d 840, 846 
(2007). Instead, the BOCC has ignored competent scientific evidence in favor of emotional lay 
argument and prognostication as to hypothetical future applications for building permits; has 
violated KHD's due process rights with un-noticed amateur traffic studies; has ignored its own 
specific zoning ordinance in favor of generic coinprehensive plan concepts; has violated its Post- 
Mediation Agreement with KHD and has violated the basic precepts of res judicata, and has 

made decisions based on political climate - all to satisfy the public's anti-development 
sentiment. 
In addition, the County in direct contradiction to the issues that were limited to be heard 
in the second BOCC hearing by the Post-Mediation Agreement, violated quasi-estoppel and 
administrative res judicata, claim and issue preclusion as a question of law and fact. Res 
Judicata is clearly applicable to administrative decisions under Idaho law. Idaho State Bar v. 
Everard, 142 Idaho 109, 124 P. 3d 985 (2005); Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Water 
Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 70 P. 3d 669 (2003); J&J Contractors v. State by Idaho 
Transportation Board, 118 Idaho 535,792 P.2d 1383 (1990). 
Under these circumstances, attorney's fees are properly awarded. In the recent case of C 
Systems, Inc. v. McGee, 145 Idaho 559, 562, 563, 181 P.3d 485 (2008) this Court stated: 
"In addition, in an action.. .[where]. . .every matter which might and should have 
been litigated in the first suit, the C Systems claims were clearly barred by res 
judicata and we award costs and attorney's fees to McGee.", citing Andrus v. 
Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 186 P. 3d 630 (2008); Joyce v. Murphy, 35 Idaho 549; 
208 P. 241,242-243 (1922). 
As the Court set forth in Rincover, supra, an order of attorney's fees in favor of KHD is 
mandatory. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Whereas conclusively shown in KHD's opening and this reply brief, this Court should 
reverse the decision of the District Court and remand for further proceedings to the Board of 
County Cominissioners of Kootenai County, with instructions to approve, or at the minimum 
rehear, the KHD applications for planned development and subdivision approval on the basis that 
the decision of the Board denying such applications was: made upon unlawful procedures; 
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affected by error of law with respect to the application of the doctrines of quasi-estoppel, res 
judicata and issue preclusion; clearly erroneous in view of substantial evidence in the record as a 
whole; a violation of the constitutional right to procedural and substantive due process; is 
arbitrary and capricious and constitutes an abuse of administrative and quasi-judicial discretion. 
Knight v. New Mexico Department of Insurance, 124.Idaho 645; 862 P.2d 337 (Id. App. 1993). 
Where the principles of quasi and equitable estoppel, and issue preclusion govern the 
proceeding, it is right and proper for this Court to reverse and remand to the district court to enter 
a final order and judgment declaring that the planned development and subdivision approvals be 
granted and that the district court remand to Kootenai Couilty for processing the final ministerial 
approvals for the project. 
DATED this &'day of July, 2009 
Attorneys for App k Ilant, 
Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC 
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